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Introduction
The research in this paper is to be focused on examining governance and enterprise restructuring in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans) transition economies. International organizations classify the following countries in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has governance and enterprise restructuring as basic indicator of economic transition and defines it as effective corporate governance and corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring. The corporate governance is most often defined in terms of the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of top management and the board of directors.
Using data of South-East European economies, will be examined the interrelationships between governance and enterprise restructuring and set of policies that influence the governance patterns.
Two basic hypotheses to test governance and enterprise restructuring:
 1 st Hypothesis: governance and enterprise restructuring depend on set of policies : largescale privatization, small-scale privatization, price liberalization, competition policy, trade and foreign exchange system, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions and overall infrastructure reform;
 2 nd Hypothesis: governance and enterprise restructuring is important and improves over time due to imposed policies.
The academic significance of the topic is in determining the factors that influence governance and enterprise restructuring, as well as, its overall significance in the development of Western Balkans transition economies.
Theoretical and literature framework
The theory of privatization
The theory of privatization is narrowly tied to the countries that have gone through overall process of command economy and holistic public ownership of the means of production and clarifies that such ownership suffers serious efficiency loss, agency problems and political interference in the management of firms. Thus, information asymmetries and incomplete contracting problems, lead to severe incentive default which is main problem for efficiency losses (Zinnes, Eilat, & Sachs, 2001) . Hence, the incentive-efficiency pattern i.e. agency problem has two manifestations. The first, the managerial problem consists of failure of the state to monitor managers in state owned companies, i.e. the managers tend to maximize their own utility function instead of the owners. Further, the companies do not have market value, the separation of ownership and control was not possible (Vickers & Yarrow, 1990) . The second is the political problem of constant political obstruction and distortion of objectives from profit to employment maximization (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996; Shapiro & Willig, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) .
In transition economies the most prominent way to make the transformation and initial privatization was done through transfer of the ownership form public to private hands through the so-called 'shock therapy' i.e. 'transfer as fast as possible' (Kołodko, 2000; Lipton, Sachs, & Summers, 1990) . The other possible advocated way was 'gradual sales' (Kornai, 1990) . Thus, in overall transition theory it is widely believed that once the ownership is in private hands the market forces will spin processes that are going to eventually create all necessary institutions through the need of them as unavoidable feedback, hence the emerging shareholder class is to require and put in place corporate governance institutions insuring control over managers (Balcerowicz, 1993; Sachs, 1996; Stiglitz, 1998) .
The privatization processes due to existing theory and lack of practice, triggered three basic methods of privatization depending on the country, institutional and intellectual environment (Bennett, 2004a (Bennett, , 2004b ) :
1. MASS privatization -firms sold at a zero (or nominal) price 2. FULL privatization -firms sold to outsiders for positive prices 3. MIXED privatization -manager-employee buyouts (MEBOs), leased buyouts and all other cases.
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National governance systems
The two important things that have to be taken under consideration while analyzing national governance systems and corporate governance are the influence of different stakeholders of the national system of governance to shape the strategic decision making at firm level and the influence of the corporate governance institutions and overall governance on the country's attractiveness for international investment (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; McGee & Preobragenskaya, 2004) .
As a result, the influence of different stakeholders of the national system of governance on the strategic decision making at firm level is seen through the pattern of competitive advantage of the firm, as well as, the possibility these institutions to enable or restrict business practices (ex.
protection of investors, protection of employees, minority stakeholder protection, etc.) (Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003) .
The second important issue is that the institutional framework and the institutional governance regime can influence attractiveness for international investment. Hence, it has been noted the impact on the nature of foreign market entry modes or the extent to which certain market entry can facilitate the transfer of resources from entrant to entrée and vice-versa (Denis & McConnell, 2005) . Further, here it is important to stress that institutional differences between countries have an effect on their corporate governance regimes (Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) .
Analytical Framework
Sample selection and Data
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition Report series have the latest information on the countries that are classified in transition. The data that this prominent organization offers are based on wide network of sources that they obtain from national and international authorities (Bennett, 2004a (Bennett, , 2004b Zinnes et al., 2001) . EBRD tracks reforms and assesses the overall process of transition using set of transition indicators, which are formed in comparison to the standards of industrialized market economies.
Further, the data sample is mainly drawn from the extended research and data bases of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Transition Report publication series. Consequently, the data used in this research are taken from their index structure 'economic statistics and forecasts' (EBRD, 1994 (EBRD, -2009 . The scale used in shaping the transition indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, 'where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy' (EBRD, 1994 (EBRD, -2009 . There are detailed numbers for the countries in transition analyzing the period of 1989 to 2009 in different areas. These indicators are sorted by sector and country and are analyzing nine arias: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and overall infrastructure reform (EBRD, 1994 (EBRD, -2009 Gouret, 2007) . 
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Model and Econometrics
The econometric model that is used in this study is a regression model where we have estimated the fallowing equation (Freedman, 2005) :
Thus, applied to our research this model has the fallowing shape: 
Results and Effects
Results on the first assumption
The first hypothesis is that governance and enterprise restructuring depend on set of policies:
large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, price liberalization, competition policy, trade and foreign exchange system, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions and overall infrastructure reform. The transition theory explains well the effects of privatization, restructuring, competition, budget constraints, policies of governance and management (Djankov & Murrell, 2002) .
The country results of the OLS regression ( Figure 3) show that there is important development of governance and enterprise restructuring during the period of transition. Yet, the effect of the variables that most influence governance and enterprise restructuring in this set of countries is mixed. When analyzed the large-scale privatization variable (Filatotchev & Mickiewicz, 2003) and its impact on countries' governance and enterprise restructuring it was found that there is positive impact in B&H, Croatia and Montenegro, negative in Albania, Macedonia and significant Serbia (p < 0.01). Finally, the overall infrastructure reform gave negative outcome in almost all countries and it is most probably due to the fact that the disinvestment in infrastructure is constant lag in transition countries.
Almost two decades of transition is fairly enough to allow good research on the links between different economic reforms. It is worthwhile to stress that all these countries started from highly distorted system and were introduced with policy reforms designed to introduce market mechanisms in order to make the allocation of resources as efficient as possible, while creating conditions for sustainable growth and improvement of living standards (De Macedo & Martins, 2008) . Therefore, examining these various variables which represent introduced policies in SEE countries that undergo stressful process of overall society transformation, confirms the uneasiness of the overall process, as well as, the varied impact of any of these policies to each other and supplementary policy issues. 
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Results on the second assumption
The second hypothesis is that the variable governance and enterprise restructuring is important and improves over time due to imposed policies.
The EBRD assesses progress in transition through a set of transition indicators which are used to track reform developments since the commencement of transition (EBRD, 1994 (EBRD, -2009 
Discussion
Due to the analysis of the first assumption where a relation was made between governance and enterprise restructuring and imposed set of policies, the results have shown that there are mixed outcomes. Indeed, there are positive and negative pressures of introduced policies on governance and enterprise restructuring in the set of SEE countries, however it is evident that overall, there is satisfactory picture of governance and enterprise restructuring progress.
The second hypothesis analyzed the importance and progress of corporate governance and enterprise restructuring. Hence, due to this observation, conducted through combination of the basic findings of the first analyzed assumption and the compared movement of only corporate governance and enterprise restructuring variables of the countries in question, it was found evidence that the transition process progresses along with the imposed reforms, and policies triggered a positive inclination of governance and enterprise restructuring.
However, the overall outcome of these countries is mixed as there are significant improvements in some countries and noteworthy lags in other. Indeed, it is needed considerable improvement in corporate governance, institution-building controlling agency problems and imposing already adopted regulation, as well as, adopting new ways of enterprise restructuring policies within existing policies of overall transition economy restructuring.
